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CaseNo.20080558-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
Robert Palmer, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals his conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and its decision is reported as 
State v. Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, 189 P.3d 69 (Addendum A). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(3)(a) (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(2) (West 2004) set forth five variants of DUE. 
Under Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(6), a "conviction for a violation of Subsection 
(2)" was a third degree felony if it occurred within ten years of two prior 
convictions. After a jury convicted defendant of DUI, the trial court dismissed the 
jury and determined that this was defendant's third offense in ten years. The trial 
court accordingly increased defendant's sentence to a third degree felony. 
Issue la: Did defendant have a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury 
determine whether he was a DUI recidivist, even though the United States Supreme 
Court has specifically held that there is no Sixth Amendment right to have a jury 
consider a recidivism enhancement? 
Standard of Review. "The Court of Appeals' interpretation of the Federal 
Constitution is a question of law that we review for correctness/' State v. Davis, 
972 P.2d 388,390 (Utah 1998). 
Issue lb: If the Sixth Amendment analysis depends on whether a particular 
statute is an elements provision or a sentencing enhancement, did Utah Code 
Annotated § 41-6-44(6) set forth elements of DUI, even though the statute repeatedly 
stated that a "conviction" occurred under Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(2)? 
Standard of Review. Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law 
that are reviewed for correctness. State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, \ 5,150 P.3d 540. 
Issue 2: If the trial court erred by not submitting the recidivism enhancement 
to the jury, was the error a structural error under the Utah Constitution? 
Standard of Review. Defendant did not raise this issue below, so no standard of 
review applies. 
2 
CONSTTTUIIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44 (West 2004) (Addendum B).1 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE 
Underlying Facts2 
On September 23,2004, Sergeant George Alexanderson of the Utah County 
Sheriffs Office observed defendant pull out of the Flying J truck stop in Springville. 
R. 104:14-15, Defendant failed to signal as he left the parking lot, and his car had 
expired registration tags. R. 104:19. 
After pulling defendant over, Sergeant Alexanderson noticed a 'Very strong" 
odor of alcohol. R. 104: 19-20. Defendant had "an extremely difficult time" 
complying with Sergeant Alexanderson's requests for a driver's license and 
insurance. R. 104:21. Defendant was "quite disheveled," his "face was flushed," his 
"hair was unkempt," he was sweating, "his speech was slurred" with a "thick 
tongue sort of speech," and he "had a hard time answering questions in more than 
1
 Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44 (West 2004) was renumbered by the 2005 
Legislature, but the crime at issue here occurred prior the 2005 amendment. Unless 
otherwise indicated, all citations to Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44 are to the 2004 
statute. 
2
 "In setting out the facts from the record on appeal, we resolve all conflicts 
and doubts in favor of the jury's verdict and the rulings of the trial court." State v. 
Babbell, 770 P.2d 987,988 (Utah 1989). 
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one or two words." R. 104:23. When Sergeant Alexanderson asked defendant to 
exit his vehicle, defendant had difficulty doing so. R. 104:50. Defendant then failed 
a number of field sobriety tests. R. 104: 56-63. Officers searched defendant's car 
and found two open, "larger" bottles of alcohol. R. 104: 24. 
Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence. R. 104: 66. After 
being taken to jail, defendant took a breathalyzer test. Defendant's blood alcohol 
was measured at .318, nearly four times the legal limit. R. 104: 66. 
Charge and Trial 
Defendant was charged with one count of driving under the influence of 
alcohol, a violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44 (West 2004). R. 1. After 
defendant did not appear for his trial, he was convicted by a jury in absentia. R. 75, 
77. 
Pursuant to an agreement with both parties, R. 105: 6-7, the trial court then 
dismissed the jury and held a hearing to determine whether the recidivism 
enhancement set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(6) (a) applied to defendant. 
R. 104:115-121. During that hearing, the State submitted documents showing that 
defendant had two prior DUI convictions within the previous ten years. R. 104:116; 
141 (Exhibits 2 & 3). Defense counsel did not object to these documents, but instead 
4 
simply argued that one of the convictions was more than ten years old. R. 104:115-
21. 3 
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial prior to sentencing, arguing that he 
had a federal constitutional right to have a jury consider the question of whether he 
had two prior DUI convictions. R. 105: 3~8.4 Following argument, the trial court 
concluded that defendant did have a constitutional right to have a jury decide the 
recidivism enhancement question. R. 105: 9-12. But the court also held that the 
failure to submit this question to the jury was harmless because defendant had not 
successfully challenged the validity of his prior convictions. R. 105: 9-11. 
Court of Appeals Decision 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals rejected the trial court's conclusion that 
defendant had a federal constitutional right to have a jury consider the recidivism 
enhancement. The court of appeals first held that while a defendant is entitled to 
have a jury consider the elements of a crime and any non-recidivist sentencing 
enhancements, recidivist sentencing enhancements maybe considered by tine judge 
3
 The trial court never issued a written ruling on the claim, but appears to 
have rejected it at sentencing. R. 105:10-11. Defendant has not renewed that claim 
on appeal. 
4
 The record does not contain a written motion, so it appears that the motion 
was made orally. 
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alone. State v. Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, f f 4-10, 189 P.3d 69. The court then 
concluded that because § 41-6-44(6) (a) set forth a sentencing enhancement, rather 
than an element of the crime, defendant did not have a constitutional right to have 
this question submitted to a jury. Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, I f 11-22. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant claims that the recidivism provision in Utah Code 
Annotated § 41-6-44(6) (West 2004) set forth additional elements of DUI, and that he 
therefore had a Sixth Amendment right to have the provision submitted to a jury. 
Defendant is incorrect for two reasons. 
First, regardless of whether the recidivism provision was an elements 
provision or a sentencing enhancement, defendant did not have a Sixth Amendment 
right to have a jury consider it. Contrary to defendant's claim, the Sixth 
Amendment does not treat elements provisions and sentencing enhancements 
differently. Instead, both provisions are treated the same for purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment. Moreover, while a defendant does have a Sixth Amendment right to 
have a jury consider any statutory provision that increases the penalty range, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that recidivism enhancements are an exception 
to that rule. Thus, defendant did not have a constitutional right to have a jury 
consider the recidivism provision at issue in this case. 
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Second, even if the Sixth Amendment analysis depends on whether a statute 
was an elements provision or a sentencing enhancement, defendant's claim still fails 
because Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(6) was a sentencing enhancement. 
Although the statute repeatedly said that a defendant was "convicted" of DUI 
under Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(2), the statute never said that a person could 
also be "convicted" of DUI under Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(6). In addition, 
while the 2004 Legislature created two variants of DUI that required the State to 
prove that a defendant was a recidivist, the Legislature retained other variants that 
did not require proof of recidivism. In this case, defendant was only charged under 
the variants that did not include recidivism as an element. Finally, defendant has 
not pointed to any legislative history that supports his claim that the Legislature 
intended Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(6) to be an elements provision, rather than 
a sentencing enhancement. 
Point II: Defendant also claims that the failure to submit the recidivism 
question to the jury was a structural error under the Utah Constitution, and that it 
therefore was not subject to harmless error review. But defendant did not invoke 
the Utah Constitution in any proceeding below. Instead, defendant only sought 
relief under the United States Constitution. Defendant's argument is therefore 
unpreserved, and it should be rejected on that basis. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO HAVE A JURY DETERMINE WHETHER THIS WAS HIS 
THIRD CONVICTION IN TEN YEARS 
Defendant argues that the recidivism provision set forth in Utah Code 
Annotated § 41-6-44(6) (West 2004) was an elements provision, not a sentencing 
enhancement, and that he therefore had a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury 
consider whether the provision applied to his case. Pet. Br. 6-19.5 
Defendant is incorrect for two reasons. First, regardless of whether the 
recidivism provision was an elements provision or a sentencing enhancement, 
defendant did not have a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury consider it. Second, 
even if the Constitution does treat elements provisions differently than sentencing 
enhancements, defendant's claim still fails because the recidivism provision at issue 
here was a sentencing enhancement.6 
5
 Although this appeal focuses on the 2004 version of the DUI statute, that 
statute was amended and renumbered in 2005, and it is therefore no longer in effect. 
Compare Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(2) to -(6) (West 2004) with Utah Code 
Annotated § 41-6a-502 to -503 (West Supp. 2008). 
6
 In his brief, defendant repeatedly states that he was denied his Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial. See Pet. Br. 6,8,9,10,17,19. When discussing this 
Court's decision in State v. Harris, 264 P.2d 284 (1953), however, defendant also 
claims that he was denied his jury trial right under "Article I, Sections 10 and 12 of 
the Utah Constitution." Pet. Br. 16. 
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A. The Sixth Amendment does not require that a jury consider a 
recidivism enhancement 
1. Contrary to defendant's claim, the Sixth Amendment does not 
treat elements differently than sentencing enhancements. 
In his brief, defendant first suggests that this case turns on whether the 
recidivism provision set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(6) was an elements 
provision or a sentencing enhancement. Pet. Br. 6-10. Defendant is incorrect 
Courts have traditionally drawn a distinction between elements and 
sentencing enhancements. See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 
239-47 (1998); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477U.S. 79,86-87 (1986). In Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, however, the United States Supreme Court abandoned this distinction for 
purposes of the Sixth Amendment. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 
(2000). In Apprendi, the Court held that the defendant had a Sixth Amendment right 
to have the jury consider a hate crime enhancement because it "increase[d] the 
Defendant did not rely on the state constitution below, but instead only 
argued that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated. See, e.g., Aplt. Br. 7. In fact, 
defendant did not even list the state constitution in his Table of Authorities. Aplt. 
Br. at ii-iii. 
The court of appeals concluded that defendant had "not provide[d] a separate 
analysis based on the Utah Constitution/' State v. Palmer, 2008 UT App 206,17 n.4, 
189 P.3d 69, and it accordingly limited its discussion to the federal constitution. Id. 
at 117-22. This Court does not consider claims that were not properly presented to 
the court of appeals. State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, H 17-19,164 P.3d 397. This 
Court should therefore limit its discussion of this issue to defendant's federal 
constitutional claim. 
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prescribed range of penalties to which [the] defendant is exposed." Apprendi, 530 
U.S. at 489. In so holding, the Court explicitly rejected the suggestion that the right 
to a jury turns on whether a statute is an elements provision or a sentencing 
enhancement. According to the Court, any "possible distinction between an 
'element7 of a felony offense and a 'sentencing factor' was unknown.. . during the 
years surrounding our Nation's founding." Id. at 478. Rather than continuing to 
rely on the "constitutionally novel and elusive distinction between 'elements' and 
'sentencing factors,'" the Court instead adopted a functional approach that looks to 
the ultimate effect of the statutory provision. Id. at 494. 
Under this approach, "the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect— 
does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that 
authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?" Id. If the answer is yes, a defendant has 
the right to have a jury consider the provision; if the answer is no, no such right 
exists, regardless of whether the provision was an elements provision or a 
sentencing enhancement. Id. 
Thus, "Apprendi repeatedly instructs... that the characterization of a fact or 
circumstance as an 'element' or a 'sentencing factor' is not determinative of the 
question 'who decides,' judge or jury." King v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,604-05 (2002). 
"Merely using the label 'sentence enhancement' to describe the [second act] surely 
10 
does not provide a principled basis for treating [the two acts] differently/7 Id. at 
602. 
Some courts have admittedly suggested that the distinction between elements 
and sentencing enhancements retained some constitutional significance post-
Apprendi. In Harris v. United States, for example, the Supreme Court resolved a post-
Apprendi Sixth Amendment claim by determining that the provision at issue did not 
set forth additional elements of the crime. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545,549-
69 (2002). In another opinion issued the same day, however, the Court suggested 
that Harris was limited to the issue of mandatoiy-minimum sentences. Ring, 536 U.S. 
at 605 n.5. Four years later, the Supreme Court removed any doubt by reiterating 
fhat under Apprendi, "we have treated sentencing factors, like elements, as facts that 
have to be tried to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Washington v. 
Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 220 (2006). According to the Court, "[assigning this 
distinction constitutional significance cannot be reconciled with our recognition in 
Apprendi that elements and sentencing factors must be treated the same for Sixth 
Amendment purposes/' Id. (emphasis added). 
Given this, defendant's argument in this case is predicated on a false premise. 
While defendant maintains that his Sixth Amendment claim depends on whether 
the recidivism provision was an elements provision or a sentencing enhancement, 
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Apprendi and its progeny demonstrate that this is a distinction without any-
constitutional significance. Instead, regardless of whether the provision was an 
element or a sentencing enhancement, "it must be treated the same for Sixth 
Amendment purposes/7 Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 220. 
2. There is no Sixth Amendment right to have a jury consider a 
recidivism enhancement. 
Given that elements and sentencing enhancements are treated the same under 
the Sixth Amendment, the question in this case is what the Sixth Amendment 
actually says about recidivism. 
In Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment jury-
right did not apply to a recidivist sentencing enhancement. Almendarez-Torres, 523 
U.S. at 239-47. The Court focused on the fact that "the sentencing factor at issue 
here—recidivism—is a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing 
court's increasing an offender's sentence." Id. at 243. The Court also relied on the 
'"distinct nature of the issue,'" and concluded that recidivism "'does not relate to the 
commission of the offense, but goes to the punishment only.'" Id. at 243-44 (emphasis in 
original) (citation omitted). Almendarez-Torres was decided pre-Apprendi, however, 
and the Court accordingly focused its analysis on whether the provision was an 
elements provision or a sentencing enhancement. Id. 
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Although Apprendi subsequently abandoned the distinction between 
elements and sentencing enhancements, Apprendi did not abandon Almendarez-
Torres' conclusion that recidivism enhancements do not need to be submitted to a 
jury. Instead, Apprendi specifically held that even under the new analytical 
framework, recidivism provisions do not have to be submitted to a jury under the 
Sixth Amendment. The Court stated the Sixth Amendment rule as follows: "Other 
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt/' Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added). 
The Court referred to this as a "narrow exception to the general rule/' and 
explained that it was constitutionally permissible because prior convictions "'do[ ] 
not relate to the commission of the offense/" Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490,496 (quoting 
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244). According to the Court, "there is a vast 
difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered 
in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to 
require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the 
judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof." Id. at 496. 
The Court has not abandoned the recidivism exception in subsequent cases. 
In Cunningham v. California, for example, the Court reaffirmed "Apprendi's bright-
13 
line rule: Except for a prior conviction, 'any fact that increases the penalty for a 
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt/" Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270,288-89 
(2007) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490). The "Federal Constitution's jury-trial 
guarantee" therefore "proscribes a sentencing scheme that allows a judge to impose 
a sentence... based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, not found by a jury or 
admitted by the defendant" Id. at 274-75. 
While defendant claims that this case turns on whether the recidivism 
provision was an element or a sentencing enhancement, that distinction is no longer 
meaningful under Apprendi. Although the Sixth Amendment does require jury 
consideration of all statutory provisions that increase a sentence beyond the 
statutory range, Apprendi and its progeny have specifically held that recidivism 
provisions are an exception to that rule. Under those cases, defendant did not have a 
Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine whether he was a recidivist. 
Defendant's claim should accordingly be rejected on this basis alone. 
14 
B. The recidivism enhancement set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 41-
6-44(6) was a sentencing enhancement, not an elements provision. 
In any event, even if there were a constitutional distinction between elements 
and sentencing enhancements, defendant's claim would still fail. Defendant claims 
that "a review of the plain language, structure, and history of the statute shows that 
the Legislature intended Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(6)(a) to be elements of the 
DUI third degree felony offense." Pet. Br. 11. Defendant is incorrect on all three 
fronts. In addition, the fact that this was a recidivism enhancement also suggests 
that Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(6) was a sentencing enhancement, rather than 
an elements provision. 
1. The statute's plain language shows that § 41-6-44(6) was a 
sentencing enhancement, not an elements provision. 
The "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative 
intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was 
meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56,1 25,4 P.3d 795. This Court looks 
"beyond the plain language only if [it] find[s] some ambiguity." Id. If there is no 
ambiguity, the plain language controls. Id. 
Subsection 41-6-44(2) set forth five variants of DUI. In the remaining 
subsections of the statute, the Legislature repeatedly stated that a "conviction" for 
15 
DUI occurred under subsection (2), indicating a legislative intent that subsection (2) 
set forth the elements of DUI. Specifically: 
• "A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsections 
(2)(a)(i) through (iii) is guilty of . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(3)(a) 
(emphasis added). 
• "A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of... " Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44(3)(b) (emphasis added). 
• "A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2)(a)(iv) or (v) is guilty of 
. . . " Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(3)(c) (emphasis added). 
• "If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44(5)(a) (emphasis added). 
• "A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44(6)(a) (emphasis added). 
• Setting forth certain penalties for "a person convicted for the first time under 
Subsection (2)." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(ll)(a)(i) (emphasis added). 
• Setting forth additional penalties for "a person convicted of any subsequent 
offense under Subsection (2)// Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(11)(a)(ii) 
(emphasis added). 
• "[A] court may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a 
violation of Subsection (2)..." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(12)(a)(i) (emphasis 
added). 
• Stating that the revocation period would "begin [on] the date on which the 
individual would be eligible to reinstate the individual's driving privilege for 
a violation of Subsection (2)." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(12)(a)(ii) (emphasis 
added). 
16 
• "If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) . . . / ' Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44(15) (emphasis added). 
Thus, under the plain language of the statute, a person was "convicted" of 
DUI once § 41-6-44(2) was satisfied. By contrast, the statute never stated that a 
person could be "convicted under Subsection (6)," nor did the statute ever state that 
a person could be "convicted under Subsections (2) and (6)." In fact, § 41-6-44(6)(a) 
itself stated that the enhanced penalties were appropriate when there had been a 
"conviction for a violation of Subsection (2)." 
Defendant is therefore incorrect when he claims that the court of appeals' 
decision results in the "unintended consequence" of recidivism being treated as a 
sentencing enhancement, rather than an element of the underlying crime. Pet. Br. 
17-19. "The best evidence of the legislature's 'intent and purpose' is the plain 
language of the statute. When analyzing statutory language, 'we presume that the 
legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its 
ordinary and accepted meaning.'" State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 82, f 7,150 P.3d 532 
(citation omitted). In this case, the Legislature repeatedly stated that the 
"conviction" occurred when a defendant violated § 41-6-44(2). Had the Legislature 
intended the recidivism provision in § 41-6-44(6) to be submitted to a jury, it could 
have said that the State also had to satisfy § 41-6-44(6) in order to obtain a 
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"conviction." It did not. The plain language of the statute therefore supports the 
conclusion that § 41-6-44(6) was a sentencing enhancement, not an elements 
provision. 
2. The statute's structure shows that § 41-6-44(6) was a 
sentencing enhancement, not an elements provision. 
As noted above, § 41-6-44(2) set forth five different variants of DUI. The first 
three variants were set forth in § 41-6-44(2)(a)(i)-(iii). These variants made it illegal 
to drive with a blood alcohol level of .08 or greater, or instead when the influence of 
alcohol "render[ed] the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle." Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(i)-(iii). The fourth and fifth variants were set forth in § 41-6-
44(2)(a)(iv) and -(v). These variants only required a blood alcohol level of .05 or 
greater, but were limited to cases in which the driver had a prior DUI conviction 
within the previous ten years. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2) (a) (iv)-(v). The first 
three variants did not have a recidivism requirement. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44(2)(a)(i)-(iii). 
When interpreting statutes, "omissions in statutory language should *be taken 
note of and given effect/" Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT110, \ 14,993 
P.2d 875 (citation omitted). Here, the Legislature specifically required the State to 
prove recidivism as an element under subsections (2)(a)(iv) and -(v), but it did not 
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require any such showing under subsections (2)(a)(i) through -(iii). This clearly 
suggests that the Legislature did not intend recidivism to be an element under the 
first three variants of the crime. 
3. The statute's legislative history shows that § 41-6-44(6) was a 
sentencing enhancement, not an elements provision. 
Defendant also argues that Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44's legislative 
history supports his claim. Defendant does not cite to any legislative history that is 
contemporaneous to this particular statute, however, instead relying on this Court's 
decision in State v. Harris, 264 P.2d 284 (1953). Pet. Br. 13-17. But Harris does not 
support defendant's claim. 
Harris was tried and convicted under the 1953 version of the DUI statute. 
Harris, 264 P.2d at 183-84. Like the 2004 statute, the 1953 DUI statute contained an 
enhanced penalty for recidivist offenders. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(d) (1953) 
(Addendum C). Before submitting the recidivism question to the jury, the trial court 
in Harris told the jury that it did not see any evidence that the recidivism provision 
had not been satisfied. Harris, 264 P.2d at 285. The jury therefore determined that 
the recidivism provision had been satisfied. Id. On appeal, this Court reversed. It 
noted that the State Constitution guarantees a defendant a right to have "all issues 
of fact" submitted to a jury, and then concluded that the "prior conviction was a 
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material element of the indictable misdemeanor with respect to which the defendant 
was charged." Id. at 285-86. 
By referring to "the indictable misdemeanor with respect to which the 
defendant was charged," this Court tied its decision to the particular statute at issue. 
Id. Contrary to defendant's assertion in this case, however, the 1953 statute is 
different from the 2004 statute on at least three key levels. 
First, the two statutes are temporally remote from each other. Not only is 
there a 51-year gap between the two statutes, but the 2004 DUI statute is also 47 
amendments removed from the 1953 statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44, 
Legislative History (West 2004) (Addendum B at 551-52). Though a number of these 
amendments occurred within a single legislative session, the statute was still 
amended by 24 different legislatures during that 51-year period. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44, Legislative History (West 2004) (Addendum B at 551-52). In fact, in 
the five years prior to defendant's crime, the statute was amended by the 1999 
Legislature, the 2000 Legislature, the 2001 Legislature, the 2002 Legislature, and the 
2004 Legislature. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44, Legislative History (West 2004) 
(Addendum B at 551-52). Given these repeated alterations, this Court's 
interpretation of the 1953 statute simply does not shed any light on the legislative 
intent behind the 2004 statute. 
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Second, defendant is incorrect when he claims that the "format" and 
"language" regarding recidivism were never "significantly changed" in any of the 
"forty plus amendments." Pet. Br. 15. In the 1953 statute, recidivism was discussed 
in a single subsection: Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(d) (1953). In the 2004 statute, 
recidivism was separately discussed in Subsections (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (8), and (11). 
The 2004 statute treats recidivism in a substantially more intricate manner than the 
1953 statute, and it therefore must be evaluated on its own terms. 
Third, there was only one variant of DUI in the 1953 statute. See Utah Code 
Annotated § 41-6-44(a) (1953) (making it illegal to drive while "under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor"). The recidivism provision was then set forth in subsection 
41-6-44(d), but the statute contained no language governing the interplay of these 
two provisions. By contrast, the 2004 statute had five different variants of the crime, 
two of which expressly included recidivism as an element of the crime, and three of 
which did not. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(i)-(iii) (West 2004) with Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(iv)-(v) (West 2004). The 2004 statute therefore expressly 
separated recidivist DUI from non-recidivist DUI in a manner that was wholly 
absent from the 1953 statute. 
Moreover, the variants of the statute that included recidivism as an element 
were added by the Legislature during the 2004 legislative session, and they were 
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made effective only three months prior to defendant's arrest. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44, Legislative History (West 2004) (Addendum B at 555-56). As noted by the 
court of appeals, this supports the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend 
recidivism to be an element for the first three variants: "If the Utah Legislature 
intended to preserve a right to jury trial for recidivism enhancements under 
subsections (2)(a)(i) to (iii), it need only to have moved that subject into the 
definition of the crime itself, as it did for subsections (2)(a)(iv) and (v)." Palmer, 2008 
UTApp 206,^18. 
But the Legislature did not include recidivism in the first three variants. 
Significantly, defendant in this case was only charged and convicted under the non-
recidivist variants of the statute. R. 1,68. Defendant was not charged or convicted 
under the variants that included recidivism as an element. R. 1,68. 
In short, Harris interpreted a defunct statute that treated recidivism in a 
substantially different manner than it was treated in the statute at issue here. Harris 
does not shed any light on what the 2004 Legislature meant when it enacted this 
particular statute. 
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L The statute's purpose suggests that § 41-6-44(6) was a 
sentencing enhancement, not an elements provision. 
Finally, subsection 41-6-44(6)'s purpose also supports the view that this was a 
sentencing enhancement, not an elements provision. 
As noted by the Supreme Court, recidivism is "a traditional, if not the most 
traditional, basis for a sentencing court's increasing an offender's sentence/' 
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 243. Unlike elements provisions, recidivism 
provisions "do[ ] not relate to the commission oi the offense, but got J to the 
punishment only." Id. at 244 (quoting Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 629 
(1912)) (emphasis in original). Thus, a trial court does not need to accept any new 
fact that has not already been tested in the adversarial process when it applies a 
recidivism provision. Instead, the trial court only needs to "accept[ ] the validity of 
a prior judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had 
the right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496.7 
7
 Defendant argues that the United States Supreme Court's rulings "provide 
little if any insight into the Utah Legislature's intent" regarding Utah Code 
Annotated § 41-6-44(6) (West 2004). Pet. Br. 8. While the Supreme Court's 
interpretations of federal statutes are not controlling, they do provide guidance 
when Utah courts interpret similar state statutes. See Machan v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. 
of America, 2005 UT 37,123,116 P.3d 342; Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23, \ 11,997 
P.2d 305; Forsberg v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 2008 UT App 146,113,184 P.3d 610. 
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Given this, there is a "distinctive significance [to] recidivism/' Jones v. United 
States, 526 U.S. 227,249 (1999). The "basis for possible constitutional distinctiveness 
is not hard to see: unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the 
possible penalty for an offense . . . a prior conviction must itself have been 
established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury 
trial guarantees." Id. at 249. 
Recidivism provisions therefore stand in stark contrast to other types of 
enhancements that have been considered by Utah courts. In State v. Lopes, for 
example, this Court held that a defendant has the right to have the so-called "gang 
enhancement" submitted to a jury. State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, I f 11-17,980 P.2d 191. 
Unlike a gang enhancement, however, a recidivism enhancement does not focus on 
the crime at issue. It does not look at what the defendant actually did, or who he 
did it with, or what the results of the crime were. A recidivism enhancement does 
not even look at the underlying crime, but instead only looks at other crimes that 
were already proved under constitutional standards. 
Thus, while there is but "one criminal act charged" in a gang enhancement 
case, Lopes, 1999 UT 24 , f12 , a recidivism enhancement only applies in cases in 
which separate criminal charges have been adjudicated in separate criminal 
proceedings. Insofar as these other charges have already been "entered in a 
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proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to 
require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt/' Apprendi, 530 U.S. 
at 496, legislatures have traditionally treated such provisions as sentencing 
enhancements, rather than elements. In Almendarez-Torres, for example, Ihe 
Supreme Court stated that it could not find an instance in which Congress had 
"made a defendant's recidivism an element of an offense where the conduct 
proscribed is otherwise unlawful/' Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244. Other than 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(2)(iv)-(v), the State has not been able to locate an 
instance in which the Utah Legislature has acted any differently. 
In sum, the court of appeals' interpretation of this statute is consistent with 
the statute's language, structure, history, and purpose. The court ot appeals' 
decision should be affirmed. 
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II. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT PRESERVED HIS CLAIM THAT THE 
ALLEGED ERROR WAS A STRUCTURAL ERROR UNDER THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Defendant also asks this Court to hold that the trial court's failure to submit 
the recidivism question to a jury was a structural error under the Utah Constitution 
that was not subject to harmless error review. Pet. Br. 19-23. 
Defendant did not raise this claim at any point below. At the trial court, 
defendant did not mention the Utah Constitution at any point, let alone develop a 
state constitutional argument regarding harmless error review. R. 105:3-11. At the 
court of appeals, defendants claim was exclusively predicated on federal law. In 
his Argument heading, defendant claimed that he had been denied his "Sixth 
Amendment right/' Aplt. Br. 7, and defendant then supported his argument by 
relying on two federal decisions. Aplt. Br. 8-12. Though defendant parenthetically 
referred to the Utah Constitution later in his brief, he did not ever develop any 
argument based on it. In fact, defendant did not even cite to the Utah Constitution 
in his Table of Authorities. Aplt. Br. ii-iii. 
As noted by the court of appeals, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected 
this argument under the federal constitution. See Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 
212,218-22 (2006); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1,7-15 (1999). 
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In State v. Worwood, this Court held that the preservation rules apply to state 
constitutional claims. State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 117-19,164 P.3d 397. "[I]n 
keeping with our preservation policy, a state constitutional law argument must be 
raised in the trial court, preserved through the appellate process, and adequately 
briefed to us." Id. at % 18. Insofar as the defendant in Worwood had "failed to 
advance a unique state constitutional analysis" at any stage below, this Court 
"decline[d] to reach" his state constitutional claim for the first time on certiorari. Id. 
at % 19. Defendant's state constitutional claim in this case is likewise unpreserved, 
and it should be rejected on this basis. 
In any event, the court of appeals did not reach this claim in its decision 
below. Palmer, 2008 UTApp 206,122 n.16. If necessary, this Court should remand 
to the court of appeals for consideration of this issue. See State v. King, 2006 UT 3,1 
25,131 P.3d 202 ("Because the court of appeals did not consider this issue in the 
proceedings below,.. . we decline to address it"). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the court of appeals' 
decision. 
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McHUGH, Judge: 
fl Robert Palmer challenges his conviction under subsection 
(2)(a) of Utah Code section 41-6-44, which makes it unlawful to 
operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any 
drug (DUI) . See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2) (a) (Supp. 2004) .x 
Subsection (6)(a) of the same section declares that DUI is a 
third degree felony if the defendant has two or more prior 
convictions within the past ten years. See id. § 41-6-44(6) (a) , 
Palmer argues that subsection (6)(a) defines a separate crime, 
rather than a sentence enhancement, and that the trial court 
1. Utah Code section 41-6-44 was amended and renumbered in 2 0 05. 
See Traffic Code Recodification and Revisions, ch. 2, §§ 58-59, 
2005 Utah Laws 18, 56-60 (current version as amended at Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 46-6a-502, -503 (Supp. 2007)); Alcohol Restricted 
Drivers, ch. 91, §§ 1-2, 2005 Utah Laws 627, 627-28 (current 
version at Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6a-502, -503 (Supp. 2007)). 
Because Palmer's actions occurred prior to these revisions, we 
cite to the 2004 code unless otherwise noted. See State v. 
Gonzales, 2005 UT App 538, H 1 n.l, 127 P.3d 1252. 
committed structural error when it found Palmer had two prior 
convictions without submitting that question to the jury. 
\2 We conclude that subsection (6)(a) is an enhancement 
provision, which merely increases the sentence for a recidivist. 
Subsection (6)(a) does not define a separate crime and therefore 
does not require a jury trial to establish prior convictions. 
Accordingly, we affirm Palmer's felony DUI conviction. 
BACKGROUND2 
f3 On September 23, 2004, Sergeant George Alexanderson of the 
Utah County Sheriff's Office pulled Palmer over for making an 
illegal turn and driving a vehicle with an expired registration. 
There was "a very strong [odor] of an alcoholic beverage" when 
Sergeant Alexanderson approached Palmer. Additionally, Palmer 
had "an extremely difficult time" producing his driver's license, 
and "his speech was slurred" in a "thick tongue sort of" way. 
Sergeant Alexanderson, assisted by backup officers, suspected 
Palmer was intoxicated and administered three field sobriety 
tests; Palmer failed all three. Accordingly, Palmer was arrested 
for DUI. A subsequent breathalyzer test measured Palmer's blood 
alcohol concentration at .318, nearly four times the legal limit 
of .08, see icL § 41-6-44 (2) (a) (i) , (iii) . 
1(4 Palmer was charged by information on January 4, 2 005, with 
one count of DUI. Palmer pleaded not guilty, and a jury trial 
was scheduled for August 8, 2 006. Despite receiving notice of 
the trial date, Palmer failed to appear and was convicted in 
absentia of DUI. By stipulation of the parties, the jury was 
excused, and the prosecution presented evidence of Palmer's prior 
convictions to the trial judge, resulting in an increase in 
Palmer's sentence. 
i[5 At sentencing, Palmer argued his Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial was violated when the trial judge, as opposed to the 
jury, considered the sentence enhancement based on Palmer's prior 
convictions.3 The trial court found Palmer's Sixth Amendment 
2. "'In setting out the facts from the record on appeal, we 
resolve all conflicts and doubts in favor of the jury's verdict 
and the rulings of the trial court.'" State v. Yanez, 2002 UT 
App 50, % 1 n.l, 42 P.3d 1248 (quoting State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 
422, 422-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
3. Palmer's argument before the trial judge was that "his right 
to have the jury . . . consider the enhancement" was improperly 
(continued...) 
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rights were violated but denied Palmer's motion on the basis of 
harmless error. The trial court sentenced Palmer to zero to five 
years in the Utah State Prison, and Palmer filed this appeal. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
f6 Palmer presents one issue on appeal: "Whether the trial 
court violated Palmer's constitutional right to have a jury 
consider his prior DUI convictions . . . ." "Constitutional 
issues are questions of law that we review for correctness." 
State v. Norcutt, 2006 UT App 269, f 7, 139 P.3d 1066. 
ANALYSIS 
i|7 The right to a jury trial in criminal proceedings is secured 
by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.4 See 
U.S. Const, amend. VI. That amendment declares: "In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . ."5 Id. 
3 . (...continued) 
waived. (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, the State suggests 
Palmer's argument on appeal — that subsection (6) (a) is an 
"element" and not merely an "enhancement"--is unpreserved. We 
disagree. "The purpose of preserving the error is to assure that 
the trial court has had the claimed error brought to its 
attention in a timely fashion, allowing the trial court the first 
opportunity to address and correct the problem." State v. Beck, 
2007 UT 60, 1 8, 165 P.3d 1225. In this case, the trial court 
addressed both enhancements and elements. Indeed, the trial 
court cited to relevant authority and ultimately concluded that 
subsection (6)(a) is "not just a sentencing enhancement" but 
rather a new offense. 
4. The right to a jury trial is also secured by Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. However, Palmer does not 
provide a separate analysis based on the Utah Constitution. 
Indeed, Palmer's list of controlling statutes only contains the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. "Therefore, 
we address only the federal provision." State v. Jensen, 818 
P.2d 551, 552 n.2 (Utah 1991); see also State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 
47, 1 18, 164 P.3d 397 ("[C]ursory references to the state 
constitution within arguments otherwise dedicated to a federal 
constitutional claim are inadequate."). 
5. The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was incorporated 
(continued...) 
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%8 The Sixth Amendment's provisions have been interpreted by 
the United States Supreme Court as providing a criminal defendant 
with "the right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, his guilt of every element of the crime with which he is 
charged." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506,- 522-23 (1995) 
(emphasis added). Accordingly, if Palmer is correct that 
subsection 6(a) of Utah Code section 41-6-44 is intended as an 
element of the crime of DUI, we assume without deciding that 
Palmer had a constitutional right to have the jury determine 
whether or not the State proved that element. 
1(9 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has expressly ruled 
that the Sixth Amendment does not require prior convictions to be 
submitted to the jury when used merely as a sentence 
enhancement.6 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 
(2000) ("[A]ny fact (other than prior conviction) that increases 
5. (...continued) 
through the Fourteenth Amendment and has been declared binding on 
the states. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) 
(fl[W]e hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of 
jury trial in all criminal cases which--were they to be tried in 
a federal court--would come within the Sixth Amendment's 
guarantee."). 
6. This is an exception to the more general rule that sentence 
enhancements "must be . . . submitted to a jury, and proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt" if they "increase[] the maximum 
penalty for a crime." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 
(2000). Palmer suggests this exception stands on somewhat shaky 
footing. See id. at 489 (suggesting the prior conviction 
exception was incorrectly decided); Range1-Reyes v. United 
States, 126 S. Ct. 2873, 2874 (2006) (denying cert.) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (lf[I]t has long been clear that a majority of this 
Court now rejects that exception."). But see id. (Stevens, J., 
concurring) ("While I continue to believe that Almendarez-Torres 
was wrongly decided, that is not a sufficient reason for 
revisiting the issue. . . . The doctrine of stare decisis 
provides sufficient basis for the denial of certiorari in these 
cases." (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 
(1998))). At this time, the exception still stands and has 
recently been reaffirmed. See Cunningham v. California, 127 S. 
Ct. 856, 864, 869 (2007) ("Other than a prior conviction . . . 
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime . . . must be 
submitted to a jury . . . ." (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 231 (2005) (same). Unless 
and until Almendarez-Torres is actually reversed, it is 
controlling precedent on the scope of Palmer's Sixth Amendment 
rights. 
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the maximum penalty for a crime must be . . . submitted to a 
jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." (emphasis added)); 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 229-35 (1998) 
(ruling recidivism was not an element of a particular offense 
and, therefore, need not be charged in an indictment or 
determined by a jury). Accordingly, if the State is correct that 
subsection 6(a) was intended as a sentence enhancement, relevant 
only after a DUI conviction had been secured, Palmer did not have 
a constitutional right to have the fact of his prior convictions 
decided by a jury. 
flO Because Palmer's constitutional argument hinges on the 
classification of subsection 6(a) as either an element or a 
sentence enhancement, Palmer correctly recognizes that "[tjhe 
real issue before this Court is whether Utah Code Annotated § 41-
6-44(6) (a) ([Supp. 2004]) provides separate elements . . . or 
whether this [sub]section is only an enhancement provision." 
" [T]he question of which factors are" elements and which factors 
are sentence enhancements "is normally a matter for [the 
legislative branch]." Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228. 
We therefore look to the statute before us 
and ask what [the legislature] intended. Did 
it intend the . . . prior conviction[] to 
help define a separate crime? Or did it 
intend the presence of an earlier conviction 
as a sentencing factor, a factor that a 
sentencing court might use to increase 
punishment? In answering this question, we 
look to the statute's language, structure, 
subject matter, context, and history--factors 
that typically help courts determine a 
statute's objectives and thereby illuminate 
its text. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
til Our review of Utah Code section 41-6-44 convinces us that 
the legislature did not intend subsection 6(a) to constitute a 
separate DUI offense but, rather, a sentence enhancement used to 
increase punishment for a recidivist. 
i[l2 To begin with, subsection 6(a) 's subject matter is 
indicative of its design as a sentence enhancement. The Supreme 
Court interpreted a similar statutory provision in Almendarez-
Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), and emphasized that 
"the relevant statutory subject matter is recidivism. That 
subject matter--prior commission of a . . . crime--is as typical 
a sentencing factor as one might imagine." Id. at 229-30. 
Likewise, the Court acknowledged that "the introduction of 
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evidence of a defendant's prior crimes risks significant 
prejudice." Id. at 235. Accordingly, the Court assumed that 
"other things being equal, . . . Congress would [not] have wanted 
to create this kind of unfairness[--introduction of evidence of 
prior convictions during the guilt phase of the trial--]in 
respect to facts that are almost never contested." Id. For 
these reasons, the Supreme Court determined the statutory 
provision at issue in Almendarez-Torres was a sentence 
enhancement and not an element of the crime charged. See id. at 
234-35, 243-44 (" [T]o hold that the Constitution requires that 
recidivism be deemed an 'element1 of petitioner's offense would 
mark an abrupt departure from a longstanding tradition of 
treating recidivism as going to the punishment only." (additional 
alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
1Jl3 Of course, the general indicators of legislative intent 
recognized by the Supreme Court must give way if evidence 
demonstrates that the Utah Legislature actually intended 
subsection (6) (a) to define a separate DUI crime. See id. at 
244. However, no such evidence exists. On the contrary, 
subsection (6)(a)!s plain language demonstrates it was not 
intended to define a separate crime but, rather, to operate as a 
sentence enhancement. See generally In re Z.C., 2 007 UT 54, f 6, 
165 P.3d 1206 ("The first step of statutory interpretation is to 
evaluate the best evidence of legislative intent: the plain 
language of the statute itself. When examining the statutory 
language we must assume the legislature used each term advisedly 
and in accordance with its ordinary meaning." (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
1Jl4 Under subsection 6 (a) , " fa] conviction for a violation of 
Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is . . . a third or 
subsequent conviction . . . within ten years." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44 (6) (a) (Supp. 2004) (emphasis added). Notably, 
subsection (6)(a) does not prohibit or declare any activity 
illegal. Compare id. § 41-6-44(2) ("A person may not . . . . 
(emphasis added)), with id. § 41-6-44(6) ("A conviction for a 
violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony . . . . 
(emphasis added)). Instead, subsection (6)(a) indicates that a 
defendant has been charged and convicted "for a violation of 
Subsection (2)." Id. § 41-6-44 (6) (a) . 
[^15 In this case, subsection (2) made it illegal for Palmer to 
(1) operate a vehicle and (2) have a blood alcohol level above 
.08. See id. § 41-6-44 (2) (a) (i), (iii) . Those were the only 
elements necessary for Palmer's conviction.7 See State v. Perez-
Avlla, 2006 UT App 71, H 11, 131 P.3d 864 ("[T]hat the State show 
7. Palmer concedes that these elements were satisfied. 
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that a defendant operated a vehicle with a blood or breath 
alcohol concentration of .08 or greater . . . . [are] the only 
required showing[s] for DUI."). Subsection (6)(a) did not add to 
those two elements in any way, and, in fact, contained an express 
prerequisite before its provisions were applicable--" [a] 
conviction for a violation of Subsection (2)." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44(6)(a) (emphasis added). Thus, Palmer's previous 
convictions were irrelevant to his guilt or innocence of the 
crime charged--DUI. See id. § 41-6-44(2) (a) (i), (iii) . 
Accordingly, we hold subsection 6(a) does not define a new crime 
but, rather, operates as a sentence enhancement after a 
conviction under subsection (2) has been obtained. See 
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244 ("[R]ecidivism does not relate 
to the commission of the offense, but goes to the punishment 
only, and therefore . . . . [need not] be deemed an 'element1 of 
petitioner's offense . . . ." (internal quotation marks 
omitted) ) . 
fl6 Our ruling on this issue is further strengthened by the 
structure of the statute, which evidences the legislature's 
intent concerning when prior convictions should be considered 
elements necessary for the crime of DUI. Subsection (2) defines 
five different DUI offenses. For example, subsection (2)(a)(iii) 
makes it illegal to drive a vehicle with a blood alcohol level 
exceeding .08, regardless of whether the driver has prior DUI 
convictions. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2) (a) (iii); see also 
id. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(i). However, subsection (2)(a)(v) imposes 
stricter limits for individuals with prior convictions. See id. 
§ 41-6-44(2)(a)(v). Subsection (2)(a)(v) makes it a crime to (1) 
be twenty-one years or older; (2) have a blood alcohol level of 
.05 or higher; (3) have a passenger under sixteen; and (4) have 
"committed the offense within ten years of a prior conviction." 
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. § 41-6-44(2) (a) (iv) (creating 
similar restrictions). Thus, under subsection (2)(a)(v), a prior 
conviction is contained in the provision that defines the crime 
charged. We are obligated to assume that the legislature's 
decision to include prior convictions within subsection (2)(a)(v) 
but not within subsection (2)(a)(iii) was deliberate. See Davis 
County Solid Waste Meruit. v. City of Bountiful, 2002 UT 60, %% 10-
11, 52 P.3d 1174 (relying on a statute's structure when 
interpreting its meaning). 
fl7 Our ruling on this issue necessarily rejects Palmer's 
argument that State v. Harris, 1 Utah 2d 182, 264 P.2d 284 
(1953), compels a different result. In Harris, a defendant's 
prior DUI convictions were submitted to the jury and the trial 
judge improperly commented on the evidence. See id. at 285-86. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction, 
ruling: "[T]he right of an accused to trial by jury, assured by 
the provisions of our State Constitution, means that all issues 
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of fact shall be submitted to them and that the Court should 
neither expressly nor by implication indicate his opinion upon 
the facts or as to the weight of the evidence." Id. (emphasis 
added) (footnote omitted). The court then noted that "[t]he 
prior conviction was a material element of the" misdemeanor DUI 
charge and remanded for a new trial without the judge's 
impermissible comments. Id. at 286. 
Il8 Harris is distinguishable from this case for several 
reasons. First, Harris was decided under the Utah Constitution 
and not under the United States Constitution. See generally Wood 
v. University of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134, 1 29, 67 P.3d 436 
("We note that our state constitution may, under some 
circumstances, provide greater protections for our citizens than 
are required under the federal constitution.").8 Second, Harris 
was a correct statement of the law as it existed at that time. 
The Utah Supreme Court decided Harris forty-five years before the 
United States Supreme Court articulated the difference between 
elements and enhancements, carving out an exception to the Sixth 
Amendment for recidivism enhancements. See Almendarez-Torres v. 
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27 (1998) (ruling prior 
convictions need not be submitted to jury when used as sentence 
enhancements).9 Third, the statute considered in Harris has been 
amended more than forty times between 1953 and 2004. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44 History notes. Those amendments include the 
key language at issue in this case. See Amendments to Operating 
Under the Influence, ch. 205, sec. 1, § 41-6-44 (2) (a) (iv)-(v), 
2004 Utah Laws 785, 786 (imposing additional limits on 
individuals with prior convictions); Driving Under the Influence 
Penalty Amendments, ch. 64, sec. 1, § 41-6-44 (6) (a), 2001 Utah 
Laws 246, 247 (amending subsection (6)(a) to read: "A conviction 
for a violation of subsection (2) is a third degree felony if 
. . . . " ) ; Revisions to Driving Under the Influence, ch. 289, 
sec. 1, § 41-6-44 (6) (a) , 2001 Utah Laws 1349, 1350 (same, but 
8. Palmer has neither cited the Utah Constitution nor argued a 
broader protection here. 
9. The Supreme Court not only carved out the exception for 
recidivism, but also suggested that recidivism will generally be 
treated as a sentence enhancement. See Almendarez-Torres v. 
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230, 234-35, 243-44 (1998) ("[T]o 
hold that the Constitution requires that recidivism be deemed an 
element of petitioner's offense would mark an abrupt departure 
from a longstanding tradition of treating recidivism as going to 
the punishment only." (alteration and internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488, 496 (2000) 
(" [R]ecidivism does not relate to the commission of the offense." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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extending the relevant time period). Further, these amendments 
came after the United States Supreme Court opinions 
distinguishing between elements and enhancements, see, e.g., 
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 229-35, and presumably were made 
with knowledge of that authority, see Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 
U.S. 511, 516 (1993) (assuming Congress was familiar with prior 
judicial opinions); McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 140 (1991) 
("We certainly presume that . . . when Congress selected this 
language, our elected representatives were familiar with our 
recently announced opinions . . . . " ) ; Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 
29, % 39, 158 P.3d 532 ("We presume the Legislature is aware of 
our case law . . . . " ) . If the Utah Legislature intended to 
preserve a right to jury trial for recidivism enhancements under 
subsections (2)(a)(i) to (iii), it need only to have moved that 
subject into the definition of the crime itself, as it did for 
subsections (2)(a)(iv) and (v). 
fl9 Moreover, recent decisions from our appellate courts have 
routinely referred to subsection 6(a) as an "enhancement 
provision."10 See, e.g.. State v. Garcia, 696 P.2d 1209, 1209 
(Utah 1985) (mem.) (per curiam) ("Defendant was convicted . . . 
of FDUI1. She was sentenced . . . under the enhancement 
provisions of U.C.A., 1953, § 41-6-44(d)." (emphasis added)); 
State v. Wareham, 2006 UT App 327, % 23, 143 P.3d 302 ("[W]e 
reverse only the enhancement of [the defendant's] DUI offense, 
and not the underlying DUI conviction itself . . . ." (emphasis 
added)), cert, dismissed. No. 20060817, 2007 Utah Lexis 234 (July 
25, 2007); State v. Marshall, 2003 UT App 381, 81 P.3d 775 
(repeatedly referring to defendant's felony DUI conviction as an 
enhancement or enhanced penalty obtained under the "enhancement 
provision"); State v. Soto, 2006 UT App 122U, para. 4 (mem.) (per 
curiam) ("[S]ection 41-6-44 (6) (a), by its clear terms, permits 
enhancement based on a [prior] DUI . . . ." (emphasis added)); 
State v. Norton, 2003 UT App 431U, para. 4 (mem.) (per curiam) 
("[T]he DUI statute unambiguously enhances a third conviction to 
a third degree felony . . . ." (emphasis added)); State v. 
Hawley, 2001 UT App 284U, para. 5 (mem.) ("[T]he DUI conviction 
was properly enhanced to a third degree felony." (emphasis 
10. Palmer's own arguments appear to recognize subsection 6(a)'s 
role as an enhancement provision. Palmer's argument to the trial 
court was that "his right to have the jury . . . consider the 
enhancement" was improperly waived. Likewise, Palmer identified 
the issue on appeal as, "Whether the trial court violated 
Palmer's constitutional right to have a jury consider his prior 
DUI convictions for enhancement purposes . . . ." (Emphasis 
added.) 
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added)).11 Unlike other enhancement factors, see, e.g., Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (3) (a) (ii) (A)-(C) (Supp. 2004), there is no 
federal constitutional right to a jury trial for "recidivist 
enhancements. "12 
K20 Finally, we reject the dissentfs argument that subsection 
6(a) should not be read as a sentence enhancement because the 
increase from a class B misdemeanor to a third degree felony is 
dramatic and subjects the defendant to "serious collateral 
effects." See infra % 31. While we agree that there are 
significant collateral consequences to the elevation of a charge 
from misdemeanor to felony, we do not agree that these 
consequences invalidate the holdings of Apprendi and Almendarez-
Torres. Indeed, virtually all of the other jurisdictions that 
have addressed this issue have rejected that proposition. See, 
e.g., Tallev v. State, No. 172, 2003 Del. Lexis 643, at *5 (Dec. 
29, 2003) (rejecting argument that prior DUI convictions were 
elements because they increased sentence from a misdemeanor to a 
felony); People v. Braman, 765 N.E.2d 500, 502-04 (111. App. Ct. 
2002) (affirming trial court's enhancement of DUI conviction from 
11. The dissent argues Harris "has not been altered, 
distinguished, or reversed," see infra \ 28, and that "no other 
case has contradicted" its holding that "prior convictions are to 
be treated as an element," see infra \ 30. However, these cases 
state that subsection (6)(a) is an enhancement provision. The 
explicit language of these rulings, in light of the post-Harris 
precedent of the United States Supreme Court clearly 
distinguishing between elements and enhancements, convinces us 
that Harris has at least been put into question. See, e.g. 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000); Almendarez-
Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 229-35 (1998) . Moreover, 
in the more than fifty years since Harris was decided, neither 
Utah appellate court has relied on Harris for the proposition the 
dissent suggests. 
12. Regardless of whether the factors contained in section 41-6-
44(3)(a)(ii)(A)-(C) are deemed elements, as argued by the 
dissent, or enhancements that increase the maximum penalty, as we 
hold, these factors must be submitted to the jury and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Apprendi, 53 0 U.S. at 476. In 
contrast, recidivist enhancements stand on a unique legal footing 
that allows the trial judge to determine if the defendant is a 
repeat offender. Consequently, the designation of a factor as an 
enhancement or an element will determine whether that fact must 
be proved to obtain a conviction, or merely to enhance the 
punishment after conviction. Designation as an enhancement will 
not, however, definitively answer the question of whether the 
jury must decide whether that fact has been proved. 
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misdemeanor to felony even though defendant's prior convictions 
were not submitted to the jury); State v. Kendall, 58 P.3d 660, 
6 67-68 (Kan. 2 002) (rejecting argument that defendant's "two 
prior DUT convictions must be proven to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt before that fact can be used to change the 
classification of [the defendant's] crime from a misdemeanor to a 
felony"); State v. Pike, 162 S.W.3d 464, 470 (Mo. 2005) (holding 
DUI enhancement from a misdemeanor to a felony based on a prior 
conviction did not constitute a new offense); State v. Lebaron, 
808 A.2d 541, 543-45 (N.H. 2002) (holding prior convictions "need 
not hav'e been . . . proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt" 
even though they increased defendant's sentence from a 
misdemeanor to a felony) . But see United States v. Rodriguez-
Gonzales, 358 F.3d 1156, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004) ("The existence of 
a prior conviction . . . substantively transforms a second 
conviction under the statute from a misdemeanor to a felony. A 
prior conviction is therefore more than a sentencing factor 
.") .13 
f21 In addition, the dissent's argument ignores the "serious 
collateral effects" of confinement in prison. In Almendarez-
Torres v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that a sentence 
enhancement which increased a defendant's potential term of 
confinement in prison from two years to twenty years based solely 
upon the defendant's prior convictions need not be submitted to 
the jury. See 523 U.S. at 226-27. Almendarez-Torres was 
reaffirmed in Apprendi and other courts have applied these cases 
13. The validity of Rodriguez-Gonzales is in question. The 
Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, considered and rejected a similar 
argument in 2002. See United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 
1201, 1208-11 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), overruled in part by 
United States v. Rodriguez, 76 U.S.L.W. 4302 (2008) (holding that 
"maximum penalty prescribed by law" as used in federal Armed 
Career Criminal Act includes any time added under recidivist 
enhancements). Notably, the en banc majority did so over the 
dissent's objection that "[r]aising the level of crime from a 
misdemeanor to a felony adds such grave consequences for the 
individual charged with a crime that it seems wholly 
inconceivable that the element which causes this escalation can 
be deemed merely a sentencing factor." Id. at 1218-19 (Kozinski, 
J., dissenting). Moreover, since the decision in Rodriguez-
Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit has held that the increase of a 
defendant's sentence from twenty years in prison to "a mandatory 
minimum sentence of life imprisonment based on [the trial 
court's] finding that [defendant] had two prior" convictions was 
a sentencing factor which did not need to be submitted to the 
jury. United States v. McCanev, 177 F. App'x 704, 709-10 (9th* 
Cir.), cert, denied, 127 S. Ct. 831 (2006). 
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to instances where a defendant's term of confinement was enhanced 
to a sentence of life in prison. See, e.g., United States v. 
Ceballos, 302 F.3d 679, 696 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 186 n.16 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Phipps, 259 F.3d 961, 962-63 (8th Cir. 2001). See generally 
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 229-35 (holding the "magnitude of 
the increase in the maximum authorized sentence" "prove[d] 
little" (emphasis omitted)). Thus, while the dissent correctly 
notes that enhancing a defendant's sentence to a felony means the 
defendant may "incur serious collateral effects such as 
employment and deportation . . . as well as loss of voting and 
gun possession privileges," see infra \ 31, we find these 
"serious collateral effects" pale in comparison to the complete 
loss of freedom--sometimes for life--approved by the Supreme 
Court and applied by other jurisdictions. For example, in 
addition to his confinement for twenty rather than two years, the 
defendant in Almendarez-Torres could not vote, possess a gun, or 
obtain gainful employment during the eighteen extra years he was 
incarcerated. Accordingly, although we acknowledge the very real 
consequences of elevating a charge from a misdemeanor to a 
felony, we are unpersuaded that the consequences are greater than 
those present in Almendarez-Torres.14 
^22 Because subsection (6) (a) is a sentence enhancement based on 
recidivism and not an element of the crime charged, Palmer did 
not have a constitutional right to have his prior convictions 
decided by a jury.15 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 
476 (2000); Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 229-35; Jones v. 
United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999). Accordingly, we affirm 
the trial court's ruling on these grounds. See State v. Tueller, 
2001 UT App 317, H 23, 37 P.3d 1180 ("It is a well-established 
rule that we may affirm a judgment of the trial court on grounds 
other than those used as the basis for its decision.").16 
14. Under the dissent's argument, the State would be incapable of 
"enhancing" numerous crimes, as opposed to charging them as new 
crimes with separate "elements," regardless of the number of 
defendant's prior convictions. Under Utah law, even the most 
severe misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment "for a term not 
exceeding one year." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-204 (2003). Thus, 
anytime the legislature determines the punishment for a repeat 
offender should extend incarceration beyond one year, it must do 
so by changing the level of the offense to a felony. 
15. Proof of Palmer's previous convictions was submitted by 
exhibit to the trial court and included in the record on appeal. 
16. Even if we agreed with the dissent that Palmer has a 
(continued...) 
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CONCLUSION 
^23 We conclude that subsection (6)(a) is a penalty provision 
that simply increases the sentence for a recidivist. Because the 
Sixth Amendment does not require recidivism to be submitted to 
the jury when used merely as a sentence enhancement, we affirm 
Palmer's felony sentence for driving under the influence. 
H24 Affirmed. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
1|25 I CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
THORNE, Judge (dissenting): 
i[26 I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this 
case, which concludes that the legislature intended Utah Code 
section 41-6-44(6) (a) to constitute a sentence enhancement used 
to increase punishment for a recidivist rather than a separate 
DUI offense element. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) (Supp. 
2004). In particular, I disagree with the majority's treatment 
of State v. Harris, 1 Utah 2d 182, 264 P.2d 284 (1953), and with 
the majority's statutory interpretation of section 41-6-44. 
16 . ( ...continued) 
constitutional right to have his prior convictions submitted to 
the jury, any violation of that right may very well be subject to 
harmless-error analysis--an issue we need not address today. See 
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9-13 (1999) (applying 
harmless error analysis, rather than structural error, where jury 
was not instructed on one element of the offense); Washington v. 
Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. 2546, 2551-53 (2006) ("Failure to submit a 
sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element 
to the jury, is not structural error."). 
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1)27 Both the pertinent case law ruling in Harris that a prior 
conviction is a material element for which the jury must 
determine proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the text of the 
statute--which does not unambiguously provide that prior 
convictions are to be used merely as a sentencing enhancement, 
support the conclusion that subsection (6)(a)--is a separate 
offense that includes the violation described in subsection 
(2)(a) and adds the additional element of "a third or subsequent 
conviction under this section within ten years of two or more 
prior convictions." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6) (a) . 
[^28 To begin, I disagree with the majority's disregard of 
Harris. The majority attempts to distinguish Harris from this 
case by stating first that it is not applicable because it was 
decided under Utah's Constitution, which Palmer has not cited. 
Nonetheless, Harris is binding law that is directly on point. In 
Harris, the supreme court interpreted and applied a similar 
version of the relevant statute. The majority fails to 
acknowledge that although Harris was decided forty-five years 
ago, it has not been altered, distinguished, or reversed since 
the Utah Supreme Court decided it. 
1(29 Second, the majority dismisses Harris because the case was 
decided before the United States Supreme Court decided 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), and 
because section 41-6-44 has been amended more than forty times 
since Harris was decided. However, Almendarez-Torres provides 
little guidance as to whether the Utah State Legislature intended 
subsection 41-6-44(6)(a) to be a separate element of the offense 
or just a penalty enhancement. In Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme 
Court merely held that Congress intended to set forth a 
sentencing factor in United States Code subsection 1326(b)(2). 
See 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(2) (1988). Thus, it makes no difference 
that Harris was decided prior to Almendarez-Torres. 
i]3 0 Although the majority is correct in pointing out that Utah 
Code section 41-6-44 has been amended over forty times since 
Harris, the language and structure of the code is substantially 
the same. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953); see id. § 41-6-44 
(Supp. 2004) . Both versions of the statute set forth the initial 
elements of a DUI crime and then provide additional elements in 
later subsections. See id. § 41-6-44(d) (1953) ("Every person 
who is convicted of a violation of this section shall be punished 
upon a first conviction by . . . , a second or subsequent 
conviction, . . . shall be punished by . . . ." (emphasis 
added)); id. § 41-6-44(6) (a) (2004) ("A conviction for a 
violation of [s]ubsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is: 
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within 
ten years . . . ." (emphasis added)). Additionally, it is of no 
real consequence that the majority suggests that recent decisions 
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have referred to subsection (6)(a) as an enhancement provision. 
Instead, it is key that Harris provides that prior convictions 
are to be treated as an element and no other case has 
contradicted that holding. 
f31 Moreover, the plain language and structure of the statute 
supports the Harris ruling that a prior conviction is a material 
element for which the jury must determine proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. First, I disagree with the majority's focus on 
the fact that recidivism is the relevant subject matter of the 
statute, which the majority considers to be merely a typical 
factor to be considered at sentencing. See supra ^ 12; see also 
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 230. Although recidivism may be 
used as a sentencing factor, this categorization alone does not 
make clear the meaning of the statute. Rather, the issue before 
us is whether the legislature intended prior convictions under 
subsection (6)(b), that not only increases punishment but alters 
the degree of the charge, to be treated as a sentence enhancement 
or an element of the offense. A statute that allows a defendant 
to be charged and convicted without a jury trial on elements 
which change the charge from a class B misdemeanor to a third 
degree felony is disconcerting and reaches beyond mere punishment 
enhancement to subject a defendant convicted of such a felony to 
potentially incur serious collateral effects such as employment 
and deportation issues as well as loss of voting and gun 
possession privileges.1 
i[32 I am not persuaded by the majority's reading of the plain 
language. The majority considers the plain language of 
subsections (6)(a) and (2) in conjunction with one another and 
determines that because subsection (6)(a) does not prohibit any 
particular activity or provide additional elements to those 
already articulated in subsection (2), that the language in 
subsection (6)(a), "[a] conviction for a violation of 
[s]ubsection (2)," is an express prerequisite to application of 
subsection (6)(a), making subsection (6)(a) a sentencing 
enhancement only. 
[^33 Rather, I read subsection (6) (a) as providing an additional 
element to those contained in subsection (2). Subsection (6)(a) 
makes it clear that before a defendant may be charged and 
convicted of a third degree felony DUI an additional element must 
be established, i.e., "a third or subsequent conviction 
. . . within ten years of two or more prior convictions." Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6) (a) (2004). As such, Palmer should not be 
convicted of third degree DUI without proof beyond a reasonable 
1. Under federal law, a convicted felon may not possess a gun. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2000). 
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doubt that he had a third DUI conviction within ten years. 
Moreover, a prior conviction ought to be considered as an element 
because it is the only difference between a class B misdemeanor 
and third degree felony DUI. Without such a reading, the two 
charges would merge and a defendant who met all of the elements 
for a class B misdemeanor could be charged and convicted for a 
third degree felony with the presence or absence of a prior 
conviction considered only at sentencing. 
i[34 Finally, the structure of the statute supports the Harris 
ruling and the plain language reading of the statute articulated 
above. The majority also considers the structure of the statute 
and notes that several DUI crimes described in subsection 
(2) include within that section the element of prior convictions. 
While the majority would conclude that because we assume that the 
legislature's decision to include prior convictions within 
subsection (2)(a)(iv) and (v), and not within subsection 
(2)(a)(iii)--the section Palmer is being charged with--the 
difference was deliberate, and the prior conviction articulated 
in subsection (6)(a) is merely a sentencing enhancement. The 
majority concludes that had the legislature wanted to include 
prior conviction as an element to the violation articulated in 
(2) (a) (iii) it would have done so within that subsection and not 
in a later subsection. However, a closer look at the structure 
of the statute reveals evidence that the legislature intended 
prior convictions under subsection (6)(a) to be treated as an 
element of the crime of third degree felony DUI. 
i|3 5 The statute contains several sections which provide 
additional elements in a structure similar to subsection (6)(a). 
See id. §§ 41-6-44 (3) (a) (ii) (A)-(C) , (3) (b) . For instance, 
subsection (3)(a)(ii)(B) incorporates the additional element of 
"ha[ving] a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the 
time of the offense" into the violation articulated in subsection 
(2) . Id. § 41-6-44 (3) (a) (ii) (B) . Subsection (3) (a) (ii) (B), 
which requires proof of "a passenger under 16 years of age in the 
vehicle at the time of the offense" has been treated as an 
element regardless of its appearance in a subsection other than 
(2). Id. This court held that 
[biased upon the plain language of [section 
41-6-44,] . . . . [t]o convict a defendant of 
violating the part of the section 41-6-44 
under which [the defendant] was charged, the 
[s]tate is required to prove that the 
defendant had a "blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the 
time of operation or actual physical control" 
of the vehicle and that the defendant "had a 
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passenger under 16 years of age in the 
vehicle at the time of the offense." 
State v. Hernandez, 2003 UT App 276, 1 12, 76 P.3d 198 (citation 
omitted). Thus, by holding that prior convictions under 
subsection (6)(a) are not considered additional elements because 
they do not appear in subsection (2), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 46-
41-6-44 (2) (a) (iv)-(v), contradicts case law. Moreover, the 
application of said reasoning would effectively make the 
additional elements listed throughout the statute sentencing 
factors. See id. § 41-6-44 (3) (a) (iii) (A)-(C) . The discord 
between the statute's construction incorporating prior 
convictions under subsection (2) for some DUI charges and 
providing additional elements elsewhere in the statute for other 
DUI charges may be due to the fact that subsections (2)(a)(iv) 
and (v) were not original to the statute and were added in 2004. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2004) (amendment notes). 
Based on the structure of the code as analyzed above it is my 
belief that the legislature intended subsection (6)(a)fs prior 
conviction language to be treated as an additional element and 
not a sentencing enhancement.2 
f36 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion. 
William A. Thome Jr., 
Associate Presiding Judge 
2. The majority asserts that this reading of the statute would 
make the State "incapable of 'enhancing1 numerous crimes 
regardless of the number of defendant's prior convictions" and 
would require the legislature to change the level of offense to a 
felony anytime it determines the punishment for a repeat offender 
should extend incarceration beyond one year. Supra ^ 21 n.14. 
This is not my position, nor would it be the result of treating 
prior convictions as an element of a DUI offense. Instead, the 
result of treating prior convictions as an element would be to 
avoid perfunctorily enhancing numerous crimes which may have 
serious collateral effects ar\d to ensure that any such 
enhancements would be done thoughtfully and with due process. 
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Addendum B 
Addendum B 
§41-6-43.8 MOTOR VEHICLES 
Library References 
Criminal Law <B»272. CJ.S. Criminal Law §§ 365 to 374, 384 to 
Westkw Key Number Search: 110k272. 391,400 to 407, 410, 418. 
§ 4 1 - 6 - 4 3 . 1 0 . Repealed by Laws 1985, 1st Sp. Sess., c 1, § 2 
§ 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination 
of both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentrationr—Measure-
ment of blood or breath alcohol—Criminal punishment—Arrest without 
warrant—Penalties—Suspension or revocation of license 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "assessment" means an in-depth clinical interview with a licensed 
mental health therapist: 
(i) used to determine if a person is in need ofi 
(A) substance abuse treatment that is obtained at a substance abuse, 
program; 
(B) an educational series; or 
(C) a combination of Subsections (l)(a)(i)(A) and (B); and 
(ii) that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
in accordance with Section 62A-15-105. 
(b)(i) "conviction" means any conviction for a violation oE 
(A) this section; 
(B) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driv-
ing under Subsections (9) and (10); 
(C) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled sub-
stance that is taken illegally in the body? 
(D) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol, any drug, or a 
combination of both-related reckless driving adopted in compliance with 
Section 41-6-43; 
(E) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; 
(F) Subsection 58-37-8(2)(g); 
(G) a violation described in Subsections (l)(b)(i)(A) through (F), which 
judgment of conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402; or 
(H) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United 
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States which 
would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol, any drug, or a 
combination of both-related reckless driving if committed in this state, 
including punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815; 
(ii) A plea of guilty or no contest to a violation described in Subsections 
(l)(b)(i)(A) through (H) which plea is held in abeyance under Title 77, 
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, even if the 
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(B) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent 
chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .05 grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(C) has a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of 
operation or actual physical control; and 
(D) committed the offense within ten years of a prior conviction; or 
(v)(A) is 21 years of age or older; 
(B) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .05 grams or 
greater at the time of operation or actual physical control; 
(C) has a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of 
operation or actual physical control; and 
(D) committed the offense within ten years of a prior conviction. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been 
legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any charge of 
violating this section, 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the. blood shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath 
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3)(a) A person jagnvicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsec-
tions (2)(a)(i) through (iii) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result 
of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of 
the offense; or 
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 years of 
age in the vehicle at the time of the offense. 
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third 
degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon 
another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent 
manner. 
(c) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2)(a)(iv) or (v) is guilty 
of: 
(i) a class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) a class A misdemeanor if the person has also inflicted bodily injury 
upon another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a 
negligent maimer. 
(4)(a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first convic-
tion, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require 
the person to: 
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(e) The court shall order probation for the person in accordance with 
Subsection (14). 
(6)(a) A conviction for'a violation of Subsectibn (2) is a third degree felony if 
it is: 
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten years of 
two or more prior convictions; or 
(ii) at any time after a conviction of: 
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is committed 
after July 1,2001; or 
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after July 1, 
2001. 
(b) Any conviction described in this Subsection (6) which judgment of 
conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402 is a conviction for purposes of 
this section. 
(c) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution of 
a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall 
impose: 
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours. 
(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court shall impose an order requiring 
the person to obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse 
treatment at a substance abuse treatment program providing intensive care 
or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow-through after 
treatment for not less than 240 hours. 
(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(c), if the 
court orders probation, the probation shall be supervised probation which 
may include requiring the person to participate in home confinement through 
the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(7) The mandatory portion of any seitfence required under this section may 
not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or 
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this 
section may not be terminated. 
(8)(a)(i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a sentenc-
ing court to order a convicted person to: participate in a screening; an 
assessment, if appropriate; and an educational series; obtain, in the discretion 
of the court, substance abuse treatment; obtain, mandatorily, substance abuse 
treatment; or do a combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a 
violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding screening, assess-
ment, an educational series, or substance abuse treatment in connection 
with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under Section 41-6-44.6 or 
41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court would render in connection 
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(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the court 
under Subsection (12). 
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or 
revocation period the number of days for which a license was previously 
suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension 
was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is 
based. 
(12)(a)(i) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court 
may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation of 
Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90 days, 
180 days, one year, or two years to remove from the highways those persons 
who have shown they are safety hazards.-
(ii) The additional suspension or revocation period provided, in this 
Subsection (12) shall^begin the date on which the individual would be 
eligible to reinstate the individual's driving privilege for a violation of 
Subsection (2). 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this Subsec-
tion (12)(b), the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License Division 
an order to suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges for a specified 
period of time. 
(13)(a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement 
through the use of electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall alert 
the appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, law enforcement 
units, or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which 
require: 
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of the 
person, so that the person's compliance with the court's order may be 
monitored; and 
(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring. 
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection 
(13)(e) to place an electronic monitoring device on the person and install 
electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the person or other 
specified location. 
(d) The court may: 
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to include a 
substance abuse testing instrument; 
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during the 
time the person is subject to home confinement; 
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person to 
attend school educational classes, or employment and to travel directly 
between those activities and the person's home; and 
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Historical and Statutory Notes 
Composite section by the Office of Legislative 
Research and General Counsel of Laws 2002, c 
8, § 1, Laws 2002, c. 54, § 1 and Laws 2002, c. 
106, § 1. 
Laws 2002, c,, 8; Laws 2002, c. 54; and, 
Laws 2002, c. 106, Laws 2002, 5th Sp. Sess. c . ' 
3; collectively rewrote this section that formerly 
provided: 
"(1) As used in this section: 
"(a) 'educational series' means an education-
al series obtained at a substance abuse program 
that is approved by the Board of Substance 
Abuse in accordance with Section 62A-8-107; 
"(b) 'prior conviction' means any conviction 
for a violation of: 
"(i) this section; 
"(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under 
Subsections (9) and (10); 
"(iii) local ordinances similar.to this section 
or alcohol-related reckless driving adopted in 
compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
"(iv) automobile homicide under Section 
76-5-207; or 
"(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any 
other state, the United States, or any district, 
possession, or territory of the United States 
which would constitute a violation of this sec-
tion or alcohol-related reckless driving if com-
mitted in this state, including punishments ad-
ministered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815; 
"(c) 'screening and assessment' means a sub-
stance abuse addiction and dependency screen-
ing and assessment obtained at a substance 
abuse program that is approved by the Board of 
Substance Abuse in accordance with Section 
62A-8-107; 
"(d) 'serious bodily injury' means bodily inju-
ry that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of 
the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
creates a substantial risk of death; 
"(e) 'substance abuse treatment' means treat-
ment obtained at a substance abuse program 
that is approved by the Board of Substance 
Abuse in accordance with Section 62A-8-107; 
"(f) 'substance abuse treatment program' 
means a state licensed substance abuse pro-
gram; 
"(g) a violation of this section includes a vio-
lation under a local ordinance similar to this 
section adopted in compliance with Section 
41-6-43; and 
"(h) the standard of negligence is that of sim-
ple negligence, the failure to exercise that de-
gree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and 
prudent person exercises under like or similar 
circumstances. 
"(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in 
actual physical control of a vehicle within this 
state if the person: 
"(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a 
chemical test given within two hours of the 
alleged operation or physical control shows that 
the person has a blood or breath alcohol con-
centration of .08 grams or greater; or 
"(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any 
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and 
any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle.^ 
"(b) The fact that a person charged with vio-
lating this section is or has been legally entitled 
to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against 
any charge of violating this section. 
"(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall 
be based upon grams of alcohol per 100 millili-
ters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the 
breath shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 
210 liters of breath. 
"(3)(a) A person convicted the first or second 
time of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of 
a: 
"(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
"(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
"(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon an-
other as a proximate result of having operated 
the vehicle in a negligent manner; 
"(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in 
the vehicle at the time of the offense; or 
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"(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a 
passenger under 18 years of age in the vehicle 
at the time of the offense. 
"(b) A person convicted of a violation of Sub-
section (2) is guilty of a third degree felony if 
the person has also inflicted serious bodily inju-
ry upon another as a proximate result of having 
operated the vehicle in a negligent manner. 
"(4)(a) As part of any sentence imposed the 
court shall, upon a first conviction, impose a 
mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 
consecutive hours. 
"(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or 
part of a jail sentence, require the person to: 
"(i) work in a compensatory-service work 
program for not less than 24 hours; or 
"(ii) participate in home confinement 
through the use of electronic monitoring in ac-
cordance with Subsection (13). 
"(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compen-
satory-service work program, or home confine-
ment, the court shall: 
"(i) order the person to participate in a 
screening and assessment; 
"(ii) order the person to participate in an 
educational series if the court does not order 
substance abuse treatment as described under 
Subsection (4)(d); and 
"(iii) impose a fine of not less than $700. 
"(d) The court may order the person to ob-
tain substance abuse treatment if the substance 
abuse treatment program determines that sub-
stance abuse treatment is appropriate. 
"(e)(i) Except as provided in Subsection 
(4)(e)(ii), the court may order probation for the 
person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
"(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the 
person had a blood alcohol level of .16 or high-
er, the court shall order probation for the per-
son in accordance with Subsection (14). 
"(5)(a) If a person is convicted under Subsec-
tion (2) within ten years of a prior conviction 
under this section, the court shall as part of any 
sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of 
not less than 240 consecutive hours. 
"(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or 
part of a jail sentence, require the person to: 
"(i) work in a compensatory-service work 
program for not less than 240 hours; or 
"(ii) participate in home confinement 
through the use of electronic monitoring in ac-
cordance with Subsection (13). 
"(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compen-
satory-service work program, or home confine-
ment, the court shall: 
"(0 order the person to participate in a 
screening and assessment; 
"(ii) order the person to participate in an 
educational series if the court does not order 
substance abuse treatment as described under 
Subsection (5)(d); and 
"(iii) impose a fine of not less than $800. 
"(d) The court may order the person to ob-
tain substance abuse treatment if the substance 
abuse treatment program determines that sub-
stance abuse treatment is appropriate. 
"(e) The court shall order probation for the 
person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
"(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsec-
tion (2) is a third degree felony if it is commit-
ted: 
"(i) within ten years of two or more prior 
convictions under this section; or 
"(ii) at any time after a conviction of: 
"(A) automobile homicide under Section 
76-5-207 that is committed after July 1, 2001; 
or 
"(B) a felony violation under this section that 
is committed after July 1, 2001. 
"(b) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the 
court suspends the execution of a prison sen-
tence and places the defendant on probation the 
court shall impose: 
"(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and 
"(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less 
than 1,500 hours. 
"(c) For Subsection (6)(a) or(b), the court 
shall impose an order requiring the person to 
obtain a screening and assessment and sub-
stance abuse treatment at a substance abuse 
treatment program providing intensive care or 
inpatient treatment and long-term closely super-
vised follow-through after treatment for not less 
than 240 hours. 
"(d) In addition to the penalties required un-
der Subsection (6)(b), the court may require the 
person to participate in home confinement 
through the use of electronic monitoring in ac-
cordance with Subsection (13). 
"(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence 
required under this section may not be suspend-
ed and the convicted person is not eligible for 
parole or probation until any sentence imposed 
under this section has been served Probation or 
parole resulting from a conviction for a viola-
tion under this section may not be terminated. 
"(8)(a)(i) The provisions in Subsections (4), 
(5), and (6) that require a sentencing court to 
order a convicted person to: participate in a 
screening and assessment; and an educational 
series; obtain, in the discretion of the court, 
substance abuse treatment; obtain, mandatori-
ly, substance abuse treatment; or do a combina-
tion of those things, apply to a conviction for a 
violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under 
Subsection (9). 
"(ii) The court shall render the same order 
regarding screening and assessment, an edu-
cational series, or substance abuse treatment in 
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connection with a first, second, or subsequent 
conviction under Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 
under Subsection (9), as the court would render 
in connection with applying respectively, the 
first, second, or subsequent conviction require-
ments of Subsections (4), (5), and (6). 
"(b) If a person fails to complete all court 
ordered screening and assessment, educational 
series, and substance abuse treatment, or fails 
to pay all fines and fees, including fees for 
restitution and treatment costs, the court shall 
notify the Driver License Division of a failure to 
comply. Upon receiving the notification, the di-
vision shall suspend the person's driving privi-
lege in accordance with Subsections 
53-3-221(2) and (3). 
"(9)(a)(i) When the prosecution agrees to a 
plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of a 
violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance 
enacted under Section 41-6-43, or of Section 
41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute 
for, an original charge of a violation of this 
section, the prosecution shall state for the rec-
ord a factual basis for the plea, including 
whether or not there had been consumption of 
alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant in connection with the violation. 
"(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the 
facts that shows whether there was consump-
tion of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, 
by the defendant, in connection with the viola-
tion. 
"(b) The court shall advise the defendant be-
fore accepting the plea offered under this Sub-
section (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation 
of Section 41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45. 
"(c) The court shall notify the Driver License 
Division of each conviction of Section 
41-6—44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Sub-
section (9). 
"(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, 
arrest a person for a violation of this section 
when the officer has probable cause to believe 
the violation has occurred, although not in his 
presence, and if the officer has probable cause 
to believe that the violation was committed by 
the person. 
"(1 l)(a) The Driver License Division shall: 
"(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license 
of a person convicted for the first time under 
Subsection (2); 
"(ii) revoke for one year the license of a per-
son convicted of any subsequent offense under 
Subsection (2) if the violation is committed 
within a period of ten years from the date of the 
prior violation; and 
"(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a per-
son as ordered by the court under Subsection 
(12). 
"(b) The Driver License Division shall sub-
tract from any suspension or revocation period 
the number of days for which a license was 
previously suspended under Section 53-3-223 
or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension was 
based on the same occurrence upon which the 
record of conviction is based. 
"(12)(a) In addition to any other penalties 
provided in this section, a court may order the 
operators license of a person who is convicted 
of a violation of Subsection (2) to be suspended 
or revoked for an additional period of 90 days, 
180 days, one year, or two years to remove from 
the highways those persons who have shown 
they are safety hazards. 
"(b) If the court suspends or revokes the per-
sons license under this Subsection (12)(b), the 
court shall prepare and send to the Driver Li-
cense Division an order to suspend or revoke 
that person's driving privileges for a specified 
period of time. 
"(13)(a) If the court orders a person to partic-
ipate in home confinement through the use of 
electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring 
shall alert the appropriate corrections, proba-
tion monitoring agency, law enforcement units, 
or contract provider of the defendant's where-
abouts. 
"(b) The electronic monitoringdevice shall be 
used under conditions which require: 
"(i) the person to wear an electronic monitor-
ing device at all times; 
"(ii) that a device be placed in, the home or 
other specified location of the person, so that 
the person's compliance with the court's order 
may be monitored; and 
"(iii) the person to pay the costs of the elec-
tronic monitoring. 
"(c) The court shall order the appropriate 
entity described in Subsection (13)(e) to place 
an electronic monitoring device on the person 
and install electronic monitoring equipment in 
the residence of the person or other specified 
location. 
"(d) The court may: 
"(i) require the person's electronic home 
monitoring device to include a substance abuse 
testing instrument; 
"(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person 
may consume during the time the person is 
subject to home confinement; 
"(iii) set specific time and location conditions 
that allow the person to attend school edu-
cational classes, or employment and to travel 
directly between those activities and the per-
son's home; and 
"(IV) waive all or part of the costs associated 
with home confinement if the person is deter-
mined to be indigent by the court. 
"(e) The electronic monitoring described in 
this section may either be administered directly 
by the appropriate corrections agency, proba-
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tion monitoring agency, or by contract with a 
private provider. 
"(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall 
cover the costs of waivers by the court under 
Subsection (13)(c)(iv). 
"(14)(a) If supervised probation is ordered 
under Section 41-6-44.6 or Subsection (4)(e) or 
(5)(e): 
"(i) the court shall specify the period of the 
probation; 
"(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of 
the probation; and 
"(iii) the court may order any other condi-
tions of the probation. 
"(b) The court shall provide the probation 
described in this section by contract with a 
probation monitoring agency or a private pro-
bation provider. 
"(c) The probation provider described in Sub-
section (14)(b) shall monitor the person's com-
pliance with all conditions of the person's sen-
tence, conditions of probation, and court orders 
received under this article and shall notify the 
court of any failure to comply with or complete 
that sentence or those conditions or orders. 
"(d)(i) The court may waive all or part of the 
costs associated with probation if the person is 
determined to be indigent by the cour t 
"(ii) The probation provider described in 
Subsection (14)(b) shall cover the costs of waiv-
ers by the court under Subsection (14)(d)(i). 
"(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of 
Subsection (2) and there is admissible evidence 
that the person had a blood alcohol level of .16 
or higher, then if the court does not order: 
"(a) treatment as described under Subsection 
(4)(d), (5)(d), or (6)(b)(iii), then the court shall 
enter the reasons on the record; and 
"(b) the following penalties, the court shall 
enter the reasons on the record: 
"(i) the installation of an ignition interlock 
system as a condition of probation for the per-
son in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or 
"(ii) the imposition of home confinement 
through the use of electronic monitoring in ac-
cordance with Subsection (13)." 
Laws 2004, c. 161; Laws 2004, c. 205; and 
Laws 2004, c. 228, collectively rewrote this sec-
tion, which formerly provided: 
"(1) As used in this section: 
"(a) 'conviction' means any conviction for a 
violation of: 
"(0 this section; 
"(ii) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of 
both-related reckless driving under Subsections 
(9) and (10); 
"(m) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any 
measurable controlled substance that is taken 
illegally in the body; 
"(iv) local ordinances similar to this section 
or alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-
related reckless driving adopted in compliance 
with Section 41-6-43; 
"(v) automobile homicide under Section 
76-5-207; or 
"(vi) a violation described in Subsections 
(l)(a)(i) through (v), which judgment of convic-
tion is reduced under Section 76-3-402; or 
"(vii) statutes or ordinances in effect in any 
other state, the United States, or any district, 
possession, or territory of the United States 
which would constitute a violation of this sec-
tion or alcohol, any drug, or a combination of 
both-related reckless driving if committed in 
this state, including punishments administered 
under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815; 
"(b) 'educational series' means an education-
al series obtained at a substance abuse program 
that is approved by the Board of Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with 
Section 62A-15-105; 
"(c) 'screening and assessment' means a sub-
stance abuse addiction and dependency screen-
ing and assessment obtained at a substance 
abuse program that is approved by the Board of 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health in accor-
dance with Section 62A-15-105; 
"(d) 'serious bodily injury' means "bodily inju-
ry that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of 
the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
creates a substantial risk of death; 
"(e) 'substance abuse treatment' means treat-
ment obtained at a substance abuse program 
that is approved by the Board of Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with 
Section 62A-15-105; 
"(f) 'substance abuse treatment program' 
means a state licensed substance abuse pro-
gram; 
"(g) a violation of this section includes a vio-
lation under a local ordinance similar to this 
section adopted in compliance with Section 
41-6-43; and 
"(h) the standard of negligence is that of sim-
ple negligence, the failure to exercise that de-
gree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and 
prudent person exercises under like or similar 
circumstances. 
"(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in 
actual physical control of a vehicle within this 
state if the person: 
"(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a 
subsequent chemical test shows that the person 
has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
.08 grams or greater at the time of the test; 
"(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any 
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and 
any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
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"(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concen-
tration of .08 grams or greater at the time of 
operation or actual physical control. 
"(b) The fact that a person charged with vio-
lating this section is or has been legally entitled 
to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against 
any charge of violating this section. 
"(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall 
be based upon grams of alcohol per 100 millili-
ters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the 
breath shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 
210 liters of breath. 
"(3)(a) A person convicted the first or second 
time of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of 
a: 
"(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
"(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
"(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon an-
other as a proximate result of having operated 
the vehicle in a negligent manner, 
"(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in 
the vehicle at the time of the offense; or 
"(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a 
passenger under 18 years of age in the vehicle 
at the time of the offense. 
"(b) A person convicted of a violation of Sub-
section (2) is guilty of a third degree felony if 
the person has also inflicted serious bodily inju-
ry upon another as a proximate result of having 
operated the vehicle in a negligent manner. 
"(4)(a) As part of any sentence imposed the 
court shall, upon a first conviction, impose a 
mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 
consecutive hours. 
"(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or 
part of a jail sentence, require the person to: 
"(i) work in a compensatory-service work 
program for not less than 48 hours; or 
"(ii) participate in home confinement 
through the use of electronic monitoring in ac-
cordance with Subsection (13). 
"(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compen-
satory-service work program, or home confine-
ment, the court shall: 
"(i) order the person to participate in a 
screening and assessment; 
"(ii) order the person to participate in an 
educational series if the court does not order 
substance abuse treatment as described under 
Subsection (4)(d); and 
"(iii) impose a fine of not less than $700. 
"(d) The court may order the person to ob-
tain substance abuse treatment if the substance 
abuse treatment program detennines that sub-
stance abuse treatment is appropriate. 
"(e)(i) Except as provided in Subsection 
(4)(e)(ii), the court may order probation for the 
person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
"(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the 
person had a blood alcohol level of .16 or high-
er, the court shall order probation for the per-
son in accordance with Subsection (14). 
"(5)(a) If a person is convicted under Subsec-
tion (2) within ten years of a prior conviction 
under this section, the court shall as part of any 
sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of 
not less than 240 consecutive hours. 
"(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or 
part of a jail sentence, require the person to: 
"(i) work in a compensatory-service work 
program for not less than 240 hours; or 
"(ii) participate in home confinement 
through the use of electronic monitoring in ac-
cordance with Subsection (13). 
"(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compen-
satory-service work program, or home confine-
ment, the court shall: 
"(i) order the person to participate in a 
screening and assessment; 
"(ii) order the person to participate in an 
educational series if the court does not order 
substance abuse treatment as described under 
Subsection (5)(d); and 
"(iii) impose a fine of not less than $800. 
"(d) The court may order the person to ob-
tain substance abuse treatment if the substance 
abuse treatment program determines that sub-
stance abuse treatment is appropriate. 
"(e) The court shall order probation for the 
person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
"(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsec-
tion (2) is a third degree felony if it is: 
"(i) a third or subsequent conviction under 
this section within ten years of two or more 
prior convictions; or 
"(ii) at any time after a conviction of: 
"(A) automobile homicide under Section 
76-5-207 that is committed after July 1, 2001; 
or 
"(B) a felony violation under this section that 
is committed after July 1, 2001. 
"(b) Any conviction described in this Subsec-
tion (6) which judgment of conviction is re-
duced under Section 76-3-402 is a conviction 
for purposes of this section. 
"(c) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the 
court suspends the execution of a prison sen-
tence and places the defendant on probation the 
court shall impose: 
"(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and 
"(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less 
than 1,500 hours. 
"(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court 
shall impose an order requiring the person to 
obtain a screening and assessment and sub-
stance abuse treatment at a substance abuse 
treatment program providing intensive care or 
inpatient treatment and long-term closely super-
vised follow-through after treatment for not less 
than 240 hours. 
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"(e) In addition to the penalties required un-
der Subsection (6)(c), if the court orders proba-
tion, the probation shall be supervised proba-
tion which may include requiring the person to 
participate in home confinement through the 
use of electronic monitoring in accordance with 
Subsection (13). 
"(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence 
required under this section may not be suspend-
ed and the convicted person is not eligible for 
parole or probation until any sentence imposed 
under this section has been served. Probation 
or parole resulting from a conviction for a viola-
tion under this section may not be terminated. 
"(8)(a)(i) The provisions in Subsections (4), 
(5), and (6) that require a sentencing court to 
order a convicted person to: participate in a 
screening and assessment; and an educational 
series; obtain, in the discretion of the court, 
substance abuse treatment; obtain, mandatori-
ly, substance abuse treatment; or do a combina-
tion of those things, apply to a conviction for a 
violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under 
Subsection (9). 
"(ii) The court shall render the same order 
regarding screening and assessment, an edu-
cational series, or substance abuse treatment in 
connection with a first, second, or subsequent 
conviction under Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 
under Subsection (9), as the court would render 
in connection with applying respectively, the 
first, second, or subsequent conviction require-
ments of Subsections (4), (5), and (6). 
"(b) The court shall notify the Driver License 
Division if a person fails to: 
"(i) complete all court ordered: 
"(A) screening and assessment; 
"(B) educational series; 
"(C) substance abuse treatment; and 
"(D) hours of work in compensatory-service 
work program; or 
"(ii) pay all fines and fees, including fees for 
restitution and treatment costs. Upon receiving 
the notification, the division shall suspend the 
person's driving privilege in accordance with 
Subsections 53-3-221(2) and (3). 
"(9)(a)(i) When the prosecution agrees to a 
plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of a 
violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance 
enacted under Section 41-6-43, or of Section 
41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute 
for, an original charge of a violation of this 
section, the prosecution shall state for the rec-
ord a factual basis for the plea, including 
whether or not there had been consumption of 
alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant in connection with the violation. 
"(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the 
facts that shows whether there was consump-
tion of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, 
by the defendant, in connection with the viola-
tion. 
"(b) The court shall advise the defendant be-
fore accepting the plea offered under this Sub-
section (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation 
of Section 41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45. 
"(c) The court shall notify the Driver License 
Division of each conviction of Section 
41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Sub-
section (9). 
"(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, 
arrest a person for a violation of this section 
when the officer has probable cause to believe 
the violation has occurred, although not in his 
presence, and if the officer has probable cause 
to believe that the violation was committed by 
the person. 
"(ll)(a) The Driver License Division shall: 
"(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license 
of a person convicted for the first time under 
Subsection (2); 
"(ii) revoke for one year the license of a per-
son convicted of any subsequent offense under 
Subsection (2) or if the person has a prior 
conviction as defined under Subsection (1) if the 
violation is committed within a period of ten 
years from the date of the prior violation; and 
"(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a per-
son as ordered by the court under Subsection 
(12). 
"(b) The Driver License Division shall sub-
tract from any suspension or revocation period 
the number of days for which a license was 
previously suspended under Section 53-3-223 
or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension was 
based on the same occurrence upon which the 
record of conviction is based. 
"(12)(a) In addition to any other penalties 
provided in this section, a court may order the 
operator's license of a person who is convicted 
of a violation of Subsection (2) to be suspended 
or revoked for an additional period of 90 days, 
180 days, one year, or two years to remove from 
the highways those persons who have shown 
they are safety hazards. 
"(b) If the court suspends or revokes the per-
son's license under this Subsection (12)(b), the 
court shall prepare and send to the Driver Li-
cense Division an order to suspend or revoke 
that person's driving privileges for a specified 
period of time. 
"(13)(a) If the court orders a person to partic-
ipate in home confinement through the use of 
electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring 
shall alert the appropriate corrections, proba-
tion monitoring agency, law enforcement units, 
or contract provider of the defendant's where-
abouts. 
"(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be 
used under conditions which require: 
§41-6-44 MOTOR VEHICLES 
"(i) the person to wear an electronic monitor-
ing device at all times; 
"(ii) that a device be placed in the home or 
other specified location of the person, so that 
the person's compliance with the court's order 
may be monitored; and 
"(iii) the person to pay the costs of the elec-
tronic monitoring. 
"(c) The court shall order the appropriate 
entity described in Subsection (13)(e) to place 
an electronic monitoring device on the person 
and install electronic monitoring equipment in 
the residence of the person or other specified 
location. 
"(d) Hie court may: 
"(i) require the person's electronic home 
monitoring device to include a substance abuse 
testing instrument; 
"(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person 
may consume during the time the person is 
subject to home confinement; 
"(iii) set specific time and location conditions 
that allow the person to attend school edu-
cational classes, or employment and to travel 
directly between those activities and the per-
son's home; and 
"(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated 
with home confinement if the person is deter-
mined to be indigent by the court. 
"(e) The electronic monitoring described in 
this section may either be administered directly 
by the appropriate corrections agency, proba-
tion monitoring agency, or by contract with a 
private provider. 
"(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall 
cover the costs of waivers by the court under 
Subsection (13)(c)(iv). 
"(14)(a) If supervised probation is ordered 
under Section 41-6-44.6 or Subsection (4)(e) or 
(5)(e): 
"(i) the court shall specify the period of the 
probation; 
"(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of 
the probation; and 
"(iii) the court may order any other condi-
tions of the probation. 
"(b) The court shall provide the probation 
described in this section by contract with a 
probation monitoring agency or a private pro-
bation provider. 
"(c) The probation provider described in Sub-
section (14)(b) shall monitor the person's com-
pliance with all conditions of the person's sen-
tence, conditions of probation, and court orders 
received under this article and shall notify the 
court of any failure to comply with or complete 
that sentence or those conditions or orders. 
"(d)(i) The court may waive all or part of the 
costs associated with probation if the person is 
determined to be indigent by the court. 
"(ii) The probation provider described in 
Subsection (14)(b) shall cover the costs of waiv-
ers by the court under Subsection (14)(d)(i). 
"(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of 
Subsection (2) and there is admissible evidence 
that the person had a blood alcohol level of 16 
or higher, then if the court does not order 
"(a) treatment as described under Subsection 
(4)(d), (5)(d), or (6)(d), then the court shall enter 
the reasons on the record; and 
"(b) the following penalties, the court shall 
enter the reasons on the record: 
"(i) the installation of an ignition interlock 
system as a condition of probation for the per-
son in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or 
"(ii) the imposition of home confinement 
through the use of electronic monitoring in ac-
cordance with Subsection (13)." 
Composite section by the Office of Legislative 
Research and General Counsel of Laws 2004, c. 
161 § 1, Laws 2004, c. 205, § 1 and Laws 2004, 
c. 228, § 3. 
Cross References 
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102. 
Chemical test for driving under the influence, see § 53-3-223. 
Conditional license, see § 53-3-232. 
Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76—4-201 et seq. 
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felony, see § 76-3-301. 
Homicide involving automobile, see § 76-5-207. 
Inchoate offenses, limitations on sentencing, see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4-302. 
Juveniles, jurisdiction of juvenile court, original and exclusive, see § 78-3a-104. 
Mandatory revocation, denial, suspension, or disqualification of license, see § 53-3-220. 
Military courts, intoxicated or reckless driving, see § 39-6-93. 
Penalties for felonies, see § 76-3-203. 
Penalties for misdemeanors, see § 76-3-204. 
Penalty for DUI conviction, amounts, see § 62A-l5-502. 
Restrictions on pleas to DUI, education or treatment incentive program defined, see § 77-2a-3.L 
Right to trial by jury, see Const. Art. 1, § 10. 
Search warrants, criminal procedure, see § 77-23-201 et seq. 
Unreasonable searches prohibited, see Const. Art. 1, § 14. 
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in an accident shall also file with the designated city department a report 
of such accident or a copy of any report herein required to be filed with 
the department. All such reports shall be for the confidential use of the 
city department and subject to the provisions of section 41-6-40. 
History: L. 1941, chu 52, §32; 0. 1943, Collateral Beferences. 
57-7-109. Automobiles@=>10. 
Compiler's Note. 6 0 C'J'8- M o t o r V e M c l e s §4 3* 
The reference in this section to "section 
41-6-40" appeared in the act as "section 
30." 
ARTICLE 5 
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS DRIVING 
Section 41-6-43. 
41-6-44. 
41-6-45. 
Powers of local authorities. 
Driving while under influence of intoxicating liquor or drug—Habit-
ual user of narcotics—Presumptions arising from alcoholic content 
in blood—Criminal punishment—Revocation of license. 
Reckless driving—Penalty. 
41-6-43* Powers of local authorities.—(a) Local authorities lhay by 
ordinance provide that it shall be unlawful for any person who is an 
habitual user of narcotic drugs or any person who is under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs to drive or be in actual physical 
control of any vehicle, and provide penalties therefor as a first offense 
consistent with section 41-6-44. 
(b) Local authorities may also by ordinance provide that any person 
who drives any vehicle in wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of 
persons or property is guilty df reckless driving, and" provide penalties 
therefor as a first offense consistent with section 41-6-45. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, §33; C. 1943, Cross-Reference. 
Powers and duties of cities and towns 
generaUy, 10-8-1 et seq. 
57-7-110. 
Compiler's Note. 
The references in this section to "section 
41-6-44" and "section 41-6-45" appeared 
in the act as "section 34 of this act" and 
"section 35 of this act" respectively. 
Comparable Provision. 
Uniform Act, § 18 (unlawful for habit-
ual user of narcotic drugs or one under 
influence of intoxicating liquor or narco-
tic drugs to drive vehicle on highway); 
§ 19 (unlawful to drive vehicle carelessly 
and heedlessly in wilful or wanton dis-
regard of rights or safety of others, or 
without due caution and at speed or in 
manner so as to endanger any person or 
property; constitutes reckless driving). 
1. Powers of cities, 
City held to have power to pass or-
dinance prohibiting driving while intoxi-
cated, notwithstanding statute on the sub-
ject. Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 U. 
113, 93 P. 2d 671. (Moffat, C. J., and 
Larson, J., dissenting.) 
Collateral Beferences. 
Automobiles<§=>332. 
61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 628. 
Driving while intoxicated, 5 Am. Jur» 
916, Automobiles § 766 et seq. 
Constitutionality .of legislative delega-
tion of powers to prescribe or vary regn-
lations concerning motor vehicles used on 
highways, 87 A. L. E. 546. 
41-6-44. Driving while under influence of intoxicating liquor or drug-
Habitual user of narcotics—Presumptions arising from alcoholic content in 
Wood—Criminal punishment—Revocation of license.—(a) It is unlawful 
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and punishable as provided in subdivision (d) of thi* * •• , 
intoxicating liquor, the .mom,? o / . t o 7 o W a L ^ f ? ;" ^ U e n c e o f 
the time alleged as shown by chemical Z L l ?* . i " ? , * " " 8 blo<"1 •« 
nriae, breath, or ether bod/y J ^ ^ ^ X ^ " ? * * * 
presumptions. slve n s « to the following 
1. If there was at that time 0.05 per cent nr !«„ u 
in the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed W ^ " " f t ° f a I c o h o 1 
not under the influence of i a t o x i e a S . / S ^ f *' t h e d e f e n d a n t ™ 
2. If there was at that time in excess nf n nc 
0.15 per cent by weight of alcohol hiZ* / V O T C e n t b u t l e s s than 
ahall not give rise to^ any preSumptSn Lt t " ^ "»<* such fact 
not under the influence oi! iJ taSatb« 1 W w d e f f d a n t was or was 
aidered with other competent S f f i f e ^ "S? **<* m a j r b e e o n-
of the defendant; e™ence * determinmg the guilt or innocence 
3. If there was at that time 0.15
 Der eft,* < .*« .* . . 
m the defendant's blood, it shall be J*™*** %* b 7 W e ^ h t o f aI°<*ol 
under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor- ° ** ^ 6 ^e^en(^ai1* was 
as ^ ^ X ^ ^ ^ » " * - t r u e d 
" W e of any narcotfc drug or w h f i s ^ r T-°i °T m d « t h e 
other drug to a degree which render! hi™ i " . , t h e m f l a e n c e of any 
vehicle, to drive a vehicle withSth s Z e Z ^ * " ^ ***»« * 
barged with a violation of this subsectonI J if * ? t h a t ^ P e™* 
uch drug under the laws of t b T ^ f c i i . . ^ - b e e n . ^titled to use 
against any charge of violating tbi subsection ^ ^ * d e f e n s * 
(d) Every person who is convicted nf « ™~i *• 
tj Punished upon a first c o n v i c t X t o ^ ^ ? , ^ ' ™ * * * * 
« days nor more than 6 months or bv » Z ? £ *** f o r n o t Iess than 
»°re than $299, or by both such nne and t . • J n 0 t leSS t h a n *<» nor 
or subsequent conviction, or on T ^ S ^ T ^ ""* 0 n a S e c o ^ 
j;ent to
 a c o n v i c t i o n ^ an o r d i n a n c e t l ? d e r , 1 t l l i s s e c t i o * ^ s e -
P ^ i e d by imprisonment for not C t L ^ InT 41"6"43 W» s h ^ be 
£ * and, in the discretion of thecourt Z F* n 0 r m o r e t h a » ™° 
^ the purpose of this section such second Z°J- ^ J T 8 t h a n $1'000-
« £ three years of the preceding 2 Z L ^ ^ Sha11 ha™ oceu** 
Z ^ ^ Z ^ ^ Z t : ^ ^ : — s license of 
^ed by section 41-643 (a). U n d e r a n f inance as
 p r o . 
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